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Abstract
We build a model that takes into consideration the evolution of
health over the life cycle and its consequences on individual optimal
choices. In this framework, the effect of environmental taxation are
not limited to the traditional negative crowding-out and positive pro-
ductivity effects. We show that environmental taxation generates new
general equilibrium effects ignored by previous contributions. Indeed,
as the environmental tax improves the health profile over the life-cycle,
it influences saving, labor supply, retirement and investment in health.
We also show that whether those general equilibrium effects are pos-
itive or negative for the economy crucially depends on the degree of
substitutability between young and old labor. We complete our the-
oretical analysis with numerical examples. Within the range of our
parameters, it appears that ignoring those general equilibrium effects
results in significantly understating the negative of environmental tax-
ation on output per capita and welfare.
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1 Introduction
What is the economic eﬀect of environmental taxation when pollution im-
pacts health? Whereas a vast number of theoretical contributions address
this question taking the eﬀect of pollution on mortality into consideration,
fewer include the eﬀect of pollution on morbidity. Furthermore, those contri-
butions do not model the interaction between pollution and health over the
life-cycle. By contrast, we build a model that takes into consideration the
evolution of health over the life cycle and its consequences on individual opti-
mal choices. In this framework, the eﬀect of environmental taxation are not
limited to the traditional negative crowding-out and positive productivity
eﬀects. We show that environmental taxation generates new general equilib-
rium eﬀects ignored by previous contributions. Indeed, as the environmental
tax improves the health proﬁle over the life-cycle, it inﬂuences investment in
health as well as saving, labor supply and retirement choices. We also show
that whether those general equilibrium eﬀects are positive or negative for the
economy crucially depends on the degree of substitutability between young
and old labor. We complete our theoretical analysis with numerical exam-
ples. Within the range of our parameters, it appears that ignoring those new
general equilibrium eﬀects results in signiﬁcantly understating the negative
eﬀect of environmental taxation on output and welfare.
The eﬀect of pollution on morbidity is well established in the epidemiolog-
ical literature. Pollution favors the development of certain chronic diseases,
especially cancer, cardiovascular disease and respiratory diseases, that have
durable detrimental impacts in terms of illness and disability.1 According
to Briggs (2003) about 8-9% of the total disease burden may be attributed
to pollution in developed countries. While the direct and indirect impacts
of illness on productivity is the object of growing interest,2 the overall frac-
tion of pollution-related health problems that aﬀect productivity is unknown.
Nevertheless, the empirical literature focuses on some speciﬁc types of pollu-
tion and ﬁnds that the negative eﬀect of pollution on productivity is quan-
titatively signiﬁcant. Hausman et al. (1984), who estimated that a 1 unit
(µg/m3) increase in particulate matter pollution increases lost work days by
0.7%. Hansen and Selte (2000) show that sick leaves are signiﬁcantly linked
to particulate matter pollution (PM10). Hanna and Oliva (2011) ﬁnd that
a one percent increase in sulfur dioxide results in a 0.61 percent decrease in
the hours worked in Mexico city. Graﬀ Zivin and Neidell (2012) ﬁnd that
a 10 ppb decrease in Ozone concentrations increases worker productivity by
4.2%.
1See Brauer et al. (2011); Ruckerl et al. (2011); Gold and Mittleman (2013); Ra-
jagopalan and Brook (2012); Brook et al. (2010) regarding air pollution, Paulu et al.
(1999), Valent et al. (2004) for water pollution and Nadal et al. (2004), Chen and Liao
(2005), Schuhmacher and Domingo (2006) for industrial pollution.
2See Bloom et al. (2004), Devol and Bedroussian (2007) and Zhang et al. (2011), for
example.
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Thus, the theoretical literature has explored the eﬀect of environmental
policy taking into consideration the link between pollution and health in inﬁ-
nite horizon models, with the idea that productivity gains and decreased med-
ical expenditure related to pollution reduction generally mitigate the costs
of environmental policies (See Mayeres and Van Regemorter (2008), Huh-
tala and Samakovlis (2007), and Ostblom and Samakovlis (2007)). Williams
(2002) proposes a general equilibrium model in which reduced pollution in-
creases health or productivity. By contrast with the previously cited studies,
the author ﬁnds that the resulting eﬀects on labor supply can magnify or
diminish the beneﬁts of reduced pollution. Williams (2003) further shows
that interactions with health eﬀects from pollution reduce the optimal envi-
ronmental tax rather than increasing it as in Schwartz and Repetto (2000).
In a growth model with research and development, Aloi and Tournemaine
(2011) ﬁnd that environmental tax has positive eﬀect on growth and welfare
through productivity gains and reallocation of resources toward R&D.
By nature, those models ignore the interactions between pollution and
morbidity over the life-cycle and are thereby missing some of the channels
through which environmental policy aﬀects the economy. It is however cru-
cial to understand this interaction on two levels that have not been studied
in the literature on environmental taxation. First, the health proﬁle is sus-
ceptible to be modiﬁed by pollution. Indeed, pollution contributes to chronic
diseases, which primarily aﬀect people age 15 to 59 according to the OMS.
The health proﬁle inﬂuences the productivity proﬁle (Lakdawalla et al., 2004;
Bhattacharya et al., 2008; Perlkowski and Berger, 2004) and also weights on
life-cycle saving , labor and retirement (Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999; Deschry-
vere, 2006, amongst others). Second, as pointed out by Cropper (1981),
individuals investment in health during the ﬁrst part of their lives interacts
with pollution, which modiﬁes their health proﬁle. Thus, a decreased invest-
ment in health can potentially oﬀset some of the beneﬁts of environmental
taxation on health.3
Therefore, we propose to study the eﬀect of environmental taxation in
a two-period overlapping generations model exhibiting three main features.
First, we explicitly model the health status as a stock that increases with
investment in health and decreases with pollution. Second, we make the
link between health and productivity over the life-cycle explicit. Third, we
model retirement decisions, allowing individuals to chose whether to con-
tinue to work or retire during the second stage of their lives. Fourth, we
allow for labor by the young and the old to be complements or substitutes.4
3It is important to note that our focus is on the time individuals derive from leisure
to invest in health (rather than on the amount they spend on health services), which
further justiﬁes the fact that our model captures investment in health in the ﬁrst part of
individuals lives (rather than the second), and its interaction with environmental taxation.
4See Kalwij et al. (2010); Gruber et al. (2010); Gruber and Milligan (2010) for empir-
ical evidence on the imperfect substituability between young and old labor in developed
economies.
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Thus, our work also ﬁlls a void in the overlapping generations generations
literature, which does not endogenize the link between environment, health
and productivity to study environmental taxation. Indeed, previous con-
tributions (Mathieu-Bolh and Pautrel (2011) and Raﬃn (2012)) assume an
ad-hoc link between pollution and productivity and do not model health.5
Our two-period framework also contrasts with Pautrel (2012) who assumes
a constant health proﬁle, does not allow individuals to choose between work
or retirement in the second period of their lives, and does not explore various
characteristics of young and old labor.
We present our theoretical results using three variants from the simplest
to the most complete one. We ﬁrst describe the steady state eﬀect of environ-
mental taxation without a choice of health expenditure or a PAYG system.
Second, we introduce a retirement choice in the model and the PAYG system.
Third, we account for the fact that individuals invest in health. Using this
approach, we are able to provide a decomposition of the eﬀects of environ-
mental taxation on output. The main results of the paper are as follows.
1. We identify new eﬀects of environmental taxation on output. A ﬁrst
new eﬀect is the "health-saving eﬀect". The environmental tax limits
the decline in health over the life-cycle. When old and young labor
are substitutes (complements), the tax increases (decreases) the steady
state interest rate, decreasing (increases) saving and output. Second,
our model captures the eﬀects of environmental taxation on aggregate
eﬃcient labor, that are channeled through several new general equilib-
rium eﬀects, the "young and old labor supply eﬀects" and the "health
investment eﬀect". Those eﬀects modify the response of aggregate eﬃ-
cient labor. This result is in sharp contrast with a large fraction of the
existing literature, where it is generally assumed that environmental
taxation only positively impacts workers’ productivity. By contrast,
in our model, increased productivity resulting from better health leads
agents to modify their labor supply, retirement decisions and invest-
ment in health over the life cycle.
2. Furthermore, we compare our results with simpler frameworks and
show that if the life-cycle characteristic of the health proﬁle is ignored
and investment in health is supposed to be exogenous, the new general
equilibrium eﬀects disappear. If investment in health is endogenous
and the health proﬁle is ﬂat, the new general equilibrium eﬀects are
modiﬁed. In both cases, numerical simulations indicate that past mod-
els understate the eﬀect of environmental taxation on output per capita
5In Mathieu-Bolh and Pautrel (2011), an exogenous age-productivity proﬁle is intro-
duced but it does not inﬂuence individual decisions. It only inﬂuences aggregate variables
through intergenerational redistribution. By contrast, in our framework, health and re-
tirement decisions are endogenous. Thus, environmental taxation inﬂuences the health
proﬁle, individual decisions, and thereby the aggregate economy.
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and welfare, even if they account for a labor supply response but ignore
life-cycle critic elements.
3. We show that the eﬀect of environmental taxation on output crucially
depend on the characteristics of old and young labor. If investment
in health is exogenous and perfect substitution of young and old labor
is assumed, like in the existing literature, the positive eﬀect of envi-
ronmental taxation on output per capita channeled through aggregate
eﬃcient labor are reduced. If, by contrast, old and young labor tend
to be complements, the eﬀect of environmental taxation on output are
magniﬁed. If investment in health is endogenous, it interacts with la-
bor supply choices and the previous result is modiﬁed. Overall, our
numerical simulations indicate that when young and old labor are as-
sumed to be perfect substitutes, the negative eﬀects of environmental
taxation on output per capita and welfare are overstated.
The paper is organized as follows. In the ﬁrst section, we present the
model. In the second section we describe the steady state for the three
variants, discuss our results and present numerical examples.
2 The model
We consider an inﬁnite horizon economy where agents live two periods. At
each date t, a population of old individuals of size Nt−1 coexist with a pop-
ulation of young individuals of size Nt = (1 + n)Nt−1, n ≥ 0.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals work during the two periods of their lives. Each young agent
is endowed with one unit of time, supplying λ1,t ∈]0, 1[ in ﬁnal production,
using mt ∈]0, 1[ as an investment in healthcare activities to improve her
health status in the second period of her life, and using the remaining time
1 − mt − λ1,t, as leisure. Therefore, when young, she earns a wage income
λ1,tw1,t, where w1,t is the eﬃcient wage. This income is used to consume c1,t,
to save st or to pay retirement beneﬁts (τ
w
t w1,t with τ
w
t ∈ (0, 1)):
(1− τwt )λ1,tw1,t = c1,t + st (1)
During the second period, each agent is also endowed with one unit of
time, supplying λ2,t+1 ∈ (0, 1) in ﬁnal production and the remaining time
1 − λ2,t+1 as retired. When old, she earns a wage income λ2,t+1w2,t+1. She
also receives the revenue of her ﬁrst period saving and retirement beneﬁts
qt+1. Therefore, her second period consumption is:
c2,t+1 = Rt+1st + (1− τ
w
t+1)w2,t+1λ2,t+1 + (1− λ2,t+1)qt+1
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with Rt+1 ≡ 1 + rt+1. Assuming a pay-as-you-go system, the retirement
beneﬁts paid to retirees in t must be equal to the contributions by workers
(who include the old born in t and the young born in t+ 1):
(1− λ2,t+1)qt+1 = τ
w
t+1 [λ2,t+1w2,t+1 + (1 + n)lt+1w1,t+1]
Therefore the budget constraint of an old agent born in t is :
c2,t+1 = Rt+1st +
[
λ2,t+1w2,t+1 + τ
w
t+1(1 + n)λ1,t+1w1,t+1
]
(2)
Individuals born in t with a health-status denoted h1,t. The health status
of an agent born in period t evolves between period t and period t+1 depend-
ing on two opposing forces (Aisa and Pueyo, 2004). On the one hand, bio-
logical processes involve a natural decay in health as time passes (Grossman,
1972). Following Cropper (1981), we further assume that health depreciates
over time as a function of the stock of pollution (denoted Pt). On the other
hand, the health status improves with the investment m made by the young
agent. Therefore, for an agent born in t, the individual health-status evolves
from period t to period t+ 1 according to:
h2,t+1 − h1,t = H(mt)− δ (Pt)h1,t (3)
with ∂H(mt)/∂mt > 0 and ∂
2H(mt)/(∂mt)
2 < 0. The positive impact of
investment in health is captured by the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side.
Therefore, investment in health makes the health proﬁle steeper. The detri-
mental inﬂuence of pollution on health appears in the depreciation rate func-
tion δ (Pt). To capture the possible threshold eﬀect of pollution in health,
we model the function δ (·) as:6
δ (Pt) ≡
d0 + ξP
ς
t
1 + d1P
ς
t
(4)
with ς, d1 ≥ 0, d0 ≥ 0 such that d0d1 < ξ, lim
P→∞
δ (P ) = d0, δ
′(P ) =
ς(ξ − d0d1)P
ς−1
(1 + d1P ς)2
> 0, δ′′(P ) < 0 if ς ≤ 1 and δ′′(P ) R 0 for any P R[
ς − 1
(1 + ς)d1
]1/ς
if ς > 1.
The lifetime utility of the representative agent born in t is:
Ut = log
(
(c1,t(1−mt − λ1,t)
ϕ)φ h1−φ1,t
)
+β
[
log
(
cφ2,t+1h
1−φ
2,t+1
)
+ γ log(1− λ2,t+1)
]
(5)
β is the time-preference parameter, ϕ captures the preference for leisure by
the young and γ captures the preference for leisure by the old (or retirement).
6See Fanti and Gori (2011).
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The parameter φ ∈ (0, 1) captures the inﬂuence of the health-status in utility.
The maximization of (5) subject to (1), (2) and (3) yield saving:
st =
β [(1− τwt )λ1,tw1,t]−
[
λ2,t+1w2,t+1 + τ
w
t+1(1 + n)λ1,t+1w1,t+1
]
/Rt+1
1 + β
, (6)
Saving reﬂects the diﬀerence between the after-tax income available in
the economy in the ﬁrst period and the present value of income in the second
period. It reﬂects that a high income in the second period requires less saving.
In the ﬁrst period, the after tax income represents the income of the young.
In the second period, it represents the income of the old, which encompasses
labor and retirement income. Retirement income is proportional to the time
retirees spent working while they were young. The later the old retire (λ2
high), the higher their income and the lower their saving.
If the presence of a PAYG system, the old receive retirement beneﬁts
whereas the young pay retirement contributions. Intergenerational redistri-
bution that takes place through the PAYG inﬂuences the saving rate. Con-
tributions to the retirement system are inﬂuenced by the choice of labor
versus investment in health by the young. Therefore, other things equal,
if the young’s investment in health decreases over time, retirement beneﬁts
decrease and saving decreases.
Utility maximization also give labor supplied by the young in ﬁnal output:
λ1,t =
(1 + β)(1−mt)
1 + β + ϕ
−
ϕ
[
λ2,t+1
w2,t+1/Rt+1
w1,t
+ τwt+1(1 + n)λ1,t+1
w1,t+1/Rt+1
w1,t
]
(1− τwt )(1 + β + ϕ)
,
(7)
and labor supplied by the old:
λ2,t+1 =
(1 + β)φ− γβ
[
τwt+1(1 + n)
λ1,t+1w1,t+1
w2,t+1
+ (1− τwt )
λ1,tw1,t
w2,t+1/Rt+1
]
(φ+ γ)(1 + β)− γ
(8)
The time spent working λ2 rather than retiring is determined by the
PAYG in the ﬁrst place. Indeed the term in brackets simply reﬂects the social
security wealth (diﬀerence between retirement beneﬁts and contributions). In
the second place, the decision to retire depends on relative wages across ages
and periods in life. In the third place, if investment by the young is large, the
old spends more time working. This is due to the fact that they are healthier
and receive less retirement beneﬁts in that case.
Finally, optimal individual health expenditure is given by:
H(mt) + (1− δ(Pt))h1,t
H ′(mt)
−
β(1− φ)
φϕ
(1−mt − λ1,t) = 0 (9)
Heath expenditure mt is positively related to the level of pollution Pt,
negatively related to labor supply λ1,t and the health status h1,t of the young.
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2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of identical ﬁrms that operate under perfect competi-
tion. They produce a ﬁnal good Yt using the production function:
Yt = BK
αK
t L
αL
t E
1−αK−αL
t
where Kt is the amount of physical capital, Lt is aggregate eﬃcient labor, Et
is the ﬂow of pollution emissions and ǫ, αK , αL ∈ (0, 1).
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We assume that eﬃcient units of labor supplied by the young depend
on their respective productivity, which is inﬂuenced by their health status
(denoted by h1,t for young and h2,t for old born at t − 1). In contrast with
previous contributions, we assume that eﬃciency units of labor provided
by the old and the young may be not perfectly substitutes in production.
Therefore, aggregate labor in eﬃciency terms is deﬁned as:
Lt =
[
ψ
(
hπ1,t l1,t
)θ
+ (1− ψ)
(
hπ2,t l2,t
)θ]1/θ
θ ≤ 1, ψ ∈ (0, 1)
where l1,t (respectively l2,t) is the amount of labor supplied by the young
(the old) at time t, and hπ1,tl1,t (resp. h
π
2,tl2,t) is eﬃcient labor supplied by
the young (the old). The parameter π ∈ (0, 1) captures the eﬀect of health
on workers’ productivity. The parameter θ measures the degree of substi-
tutability between old and young workers in production. The elasticity of
substitution between the two types of labor equals 1/(1 − θ). When θ = 1,
young and old labor are perfect substitutes. When 0 ≤ θ < 1, they are im-
perfect substitutes. When θ = 0, they are unitary substitutes. When θ < 0,
they are complements.
The proﬁt of the ﬁrm in period t is Yt−w1,tl1,t−w2,tl2,t−RtKt−τEt, where
Rt is the rental rate of capital and τ is an environmental tax levied by the
government. Proﬁt-maximization yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
Rt = αKYt/Kt (10)
w1,t = αLYt/Lt
∂Lt
∂l1,t
and w21,t = αLYt/Lt
∂Lt
∂l2,t
(11)
τ = (1− αK − αL)Yt/Et (12)
The last expression enables us to express ﬁnal output in terms of physical
capital, labor and the environmental tax:
Yt = f(τ)K
α
t L
1−α
t (13)
with Lt =
[
ψ
(
hπ1,tl1,t
)θ
+ (1− ψ)
(
hπ2,tl2,t
)θ]1/θ
, f(τ) ≡ B1/(αK+αL)
(
1− αK − αL
τ
) 1−αK−αL
αK+αL
and α ≡ αK/(αK + αL).
7See Stokey (1998) for a justiﬁcation of the introduction of polluting emissions as a
factor of production.
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2.3 Government
The government levies an environmental tax on the ﬂow of pollution emis-
sions in each period. The revenues are used to fund public abatement activ-
ities, denoted At:
At = τEt
The pollution stock rises with the ﬂow of pollution emissions and is re-
duced by abatement activities:
Pt+1 = (1− σ)Pt +Π(Et, At)
where σ > 0 is the nature regeneration rate, and Π(·) is the net ﬂow of
pollution at date t with ΠE > 0 and ΠA < 0. Because population grows
at positive rate (1 + n), therefore E and A evolve both at the same rate.
Nevertheless, in the stationary equilibrium, the stock of pollution must be
constant and equal to P . Therefore, we impose that Π(Et, At) = g(τ) with
gτ < 0 for all dates.
8 Therefore:
Pt+1 = (1− σ)Pt + g(τ) (14)
2.4 Equilibrium
First, we consider the equilibrium in labor markets. Young agents supply
λ1,tNt units of labor and ﬁrms demand l1,t. Therefore in equilibrium:
l1,t = λ1,tNt
Old agents supply λ2,tNt−1 units of labor and ﬁrms demand l2,t. Therefore:
l2,t = λ2,tNt−1
Aggregate labor expressed in eﬃciency terms is:
Lt =
Nt
1 + n
[
ψ
(
(1 + n)λ1,th
π
1,t
)θ
+ (1− ψ)
(
λ2,th
π
2,t
)θ]1/θ
(15)
From equation (11), we obtain:
w1,t = ψαLf(τ)k˜
α
t h
π
1,t
[
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
λ2,th
π
2,t
(1 + n)λ1,thπ1,t
)θ](1−θ)/θ
(16)
and:
w2,t = (1−ψ)αLf(τ)k˜
α
t h
π
1,t
(
h2,t
h1,t
)πθ (
(1 + n)λ1,t
λ2,t
)1−θ [
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
λ2,th
π
2,t
(1 + n)λ1,thπ1,t
)θ](1−θ)/θ
8See Gradus and Smulders (1993) for a justiﬁcation.
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(17)
Therefore the relative reward of young labor with respect to old labor is:
w1,t
w2,t
=
ψ
1− ψ
(
h1,t
h2,t
)πθ (
λ2,t
(1 + n)λ1,t
)1−θ
(18)
The marginal productivity of labor for the young relative to the old logically
reﬂects the relative health status of the young versus the old. If θ = 1 (young
and old labor are perfect substitutes), the relative health status is the only
element explaining the wage ratio between the young and the old. In that
case, the health proﬁle is positively related to the wage proﬁle. If 0 < θ < 1
(young and old labor are imperfect substitutes), labor supply choices by the
young and the old inﬂuences the wage ratio. If θ = 0 (young and old labor are
unitary substitutes), the health status becomes irrelevant and labor supply
choices at young and old ages are sole determinants of the wage ratio. If
θ < 0 (young and old labor are complements), the health proﬁle is negatively
related to the wage proﬁle.
Finally, equations (10) and (13) give us the expression of the interest rate:
Rt = αKf(τ)k˜
α−1
t (19)
Market-clearing in goods and capital markets leads to the equilibrium
condition Kt+1 = stNt which is expressed in terms of per worker capital
stock:
k˜t+1 ≡
Kt+1
Lt+1
=
[
ψ
(
(1 + n)λ1,t+1h
π
1,t+1
)θ
+ (1− ψ)
(
λ2,t+1h
π
2,t+1
)θ]−1/θ
st
(20)
Using (13) and (15), output per capita is deﬁned as:
yt =
(
1 + n
2 + n
)
f(τ)k˜αt
Lt
Nt
(21)
Therefore, the economy can be summarized by equations (3), (6), (7),
(8), (14), (16), (17), (19) and (20).
3 The steady-state
In this section, we investigate the inﬂuence of the environmental tax on
the steady-state equilibrium. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
the health-status of the young h1,t is exogenous and denoted h¯, and in the
steady-state, we deﬁne ∆⋆h ≡ h
⋆
2/h¯.
Furthermore, to keep the presentation of the results tractable, we make
two simplifying assumptions that we will relax in the discussion part of the
paper:
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1. The impact of health-status on production is linear: π = 1.
2. There is no PAYG social-security retirement system, therefore τwt =
τwt+1 = 0. It means that individuals fund their own retirement.
The steady-state equilibrium is such that
{
mt, Rt, h2,t, st, k˜t, w1,t, w2,t, Pt, λ2,t
}
={
m⋆, R⋆, h⋆2, s
⋆, k˜⋆, w⋆1, w
⋆
2, P
⋆, λ⋆2
}
, where variables with a ⋆ are constant.
Thus, the steady-state equilibrium is deﬁned by the following equations:
k˜⋆ =
[
ψ(1 + n)θλ⋆1
θ + (1− ψ) (λ⋆2∆
⋆
h)
θ
]
−1/θ
s⋆/h¯ (E1⋆)
s⋆ =
βλ⋆1w
⋆
1 − λ
⋆
2w
⋆
2/R
⋆
1 + β
(E2⋆)
λ⋆2 =
(1 + β)φ− γβ
λ⋆1w
⋆
1
w⋆2/R
⋆
(φ+ γ)(1 + β)− γ
(E3⋆)
λ⋆1 =
(1 + β)(1−m⋆)− ϕ
λ⋆2w
⋆
2/R
⋆
w⋆1
1 + β + ϕ
(E4⋆)
H(m⋆) + (1− δ(P ⋆))h¯
H ′(m⋆)
−
β(1− φ)
φϕ
(1−m⋆ − λ⋆1) = 0 (E4
⋆bis)
h⋆2 = H(m
⋆) + [1− δ (P ⋆)] h¯ (E5⋆)
w⋆1 = ψαLf(τ)k˜
⋆αh¯
[
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
λ⋆2
(1 + n)λ⋆1
∆⋆h
)θ](1−θ)/θ
(E6⋆)
w⋆2 = (1−ψ)αLf(τ)k˜
⋆αh⋆2
(
(1 + n)λ⋆1
λ⋆2∆
⋆
h
)1−θ [
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
λ⋆2∆
⋆
h
(1 + n)λ⋆1
)θ](1−θ)/θ
(E7⋆)
R⋆ = αKf(τ)k˜
⋆α−1 (E8⋆)
P ⋆ = σ−1g(τ) (E9⋆)
From (E5⋆), (E9⋆) and the deﬁnition of ∆⋆h, we obtain:
∆⋆h = H(m
⋆)h¯−1 + 1− δ
(
σ−1g(τ)
)
(E5⋆-1)
Using equations (E1⋆), (E2⋆), (E6⋆) to (E8⋆), we obtain:
[
λ⋆2
(1 + n)λ⋆1
∆⋆h
]θ
= D(R⋆) ≡
ψ αL
αK
[
βR⋆ − αK
αL
(1 + β)
]
(1− ψ)
(
(1 + n) + αK
αL
(1 + β)
) > 0 (22)
with D′(R⋆) > 0.
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Lemma 1. When θ = 0, there exists a unique interest rate R⋆, which is
independent from τ .
Proof. Straightforward from (22) and (E5⋆-1).
Using (15), aggregate labor in eﬃciency units can be expressed as:
L⋆ = Ntλ
⋆
1h¯
[
ψ αL
αK
(1 + β)(1 + n) + αL
αK
]1/θ
[1 + βR⋆]1/θ (23)
Using (E4⋆bis), (E7⋆), (E8⋆) and (22), we obtain:
λ⋆1 = Λ1(R
⋆,m⋆) ≡
(1 + β)(1−m⋆)
(1 + β + ϕ) + ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆
(24)
with ∂Λ1(·)/∂R
⋆ < 0 and ∂Λ1(·)/∂m
⋆ < 0.9
Using (E4⋆bis), (E7⋆), (E8⋆) and (22), we obtain:
λ⋆2 = Λ2(R
⋆) ≡
(1 + β)φ
(φ+ γ)(1 + β)− γ +
(
ψ
1−ψ
) (
γβ
1+n
)
R⋆/D(R⋆)
(25)
with ∂Λ2(·)/∂R
⋆ > 0.
This Lemma identiﬁes one special case in which environmental taxation
does not aﬀect the equilibrium steady-state: When the elasticity of substi-
tution between young and old labor is one (θ = 0), the health proﬁle has
no eﬀect on the wage proﬁle . As shown by equation (18), the wage proﬁle
solely depends upon the labor supply proﬁle. Therefore, even if an increase
in the pollution tax improves the health proﬁle, it has no eﬀect on the wage
proﬁle. As a result, in equilibrium, the income proﬁle, saving or the interest
rate are not inﬂuenced by the pollution tax. In the next sections, we will
therefore distinguish between the cases when θ = 0, and θ 6= 0.
3.1 No retirement and exogenous health-expenditures
To eliminate retirement, we make the assumption that γ = 0. As a con-
sequence, agents who have no preference for leisure in the second period of
life do not retire. Therefore λ⋆2 = 1. Furthermore, we assume that health-
care investment is exogenous, such that m⋆ = m¯. Therefore, from equation
(E5⋆-1), ∆⋆h = H(τ) ≡
H(m¯)
h¯
+ 1− δ
(
σ−1g(τ)
)
. Because g(τ) is decreasing
in τ , H(τ) > 0, ∀θ ≤ 1.
Using (22), in the steady-state, the interest rate is given by:[
H(τ)
(1 + n)Λ1(R⋆, m¯)
]θ
= D(R⋆) (26)
9D(R⋆)/R⋆ is an increasing function of R⋆.
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Proposition 1. In the stationary equilibrium, there is a unique and pos-
itive interest rate such that:
R⋆ = R(τ)
with:
(i) R′(τ) < 0 when old workers and young workers are complement in
production (θ < 0).
(ii) R′(τ) = 0 when old workers and young workers are unitary substitutes
in production (θ = 0, Cobb-Douglas case).
(iii) R′(τ) > 0 when old workers and young workers are non-unitary sub-
stitutes in production (0 < θ ≤ 1).
Proof. (i) When θ < 0, because H(τ) is increasing in τ , the left-hand side
of (26) is decreasing in τ and in R⋆. Because D(R⋆) is increasing in τ , (26)
deﬁnes a unique positive R⋆ = R(τ) with R′(τ) < 0. (ii) When θ = 0, the
left-hand side of (26) is independent from τ and R⋆. Therefore (26) deﬁnes
a unique positive R⋆ independent from τ . (iii) When θ ∈]0, 1], (26) can be
written as (using the expression of Λ1(R
⋆, m¯))
H(τ)
(1 + n)
=
(1 + β)(1− m¯)D(R⋆)1/θ−1
(1 + β + ϕ)/D(R⋆) + ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
/R⋆
(27)
The LHS of this equation is increasing in R⋆ and the RHS is increasing in τ .
Therefore (26) deﬁnes a unique positive R⋆ = R(τ) with R′(τ) > 0.
Proposition 1 states that when health evolves over the life-cycle, environ-
mental taxation impacts the interest rate. Therefore, it inﬂuences saving.
We call this new eﬀect the health-saving effect.10
It is explained by the fact that pollution aﬀects the health proﬁle over
the life-cycle. The health proﬁle inﬂuences the wage proﬁle, which modiﬁes
the income proﬁle and inﬂuences saving as a result. Indeed, pollution neg-
atively aﬀects h2. The lower h2 relatively to h¯, the higher the ﬁrst period
wage relative to the second period wage as long as labor in the ﬁrst and
second periods of life are non-unitary substitutes (0 < θ ≤ 1). When the
decrease in the wage proﬁle is steeper, saving is higher and the interest rate
is lower. An increase in the tax decreases pollution, makes the wage proﬁle
ﬂatter (it decreases less), thereby decreasing saving and increasing the inter-
est rate. When θ = 0, the health proﬁle has no eﬀect on the wage proﬁle and
we retrieve Lemma 1. There is no health saving eﬀect. When labor at old
and young ages are complements (θ < 0) the health saving eﬀect is reversed
because the wage proﬁle is negatively related to the health proﬁle (See equa-
tion 18). An increase in the pollution tax accentuates the decrease in wage
10In section 4.1, we demonstrate that if the evolution of health over the life cycle is
ignored, the health-saving eﬀect disappears.
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between the two periods in life, thereby increasing saving and decreasing the
interest rate.
Corollary 1.
λ⋆1 = L(τ) with L
′(τ) S 0 for θ R 0.
Proof. From equation (24) and Proposition 1.
With Corollary 1, we show that there is another new general equilibrium
eﬀect besides the health saving eﬀect. Corollary 1 means that young agents
reduce their labor supply when old and young workers are substitute in pro-
duction. This “young labor participation effect” is also linked to health.
Indeed, recall that when environmental tax rises and limits the deterioration
of health, the decrease in wage over the life-cycle is less steep. Therefore,
young agents decrease both their saving and labor supply. Inversely, young
agents increase their labor supply when old and young labor are comple-
ments in production. Indeed, in that case, the rise in environmental taxation
accentuates the decrease in wage over the life-cycle, increasing young agents
saving and labor supply.
The expression giving per capita output enables us to identify all the
eﬀects of a tighter environmental tax. Per capita output is given by equations
(21) and (23), and the results of the previous section:
y⋆ =
(
1
2 + n
)
f(τ)1/(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
(
αK
R(τ)
)α/(1−α)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II

ψ[(1 + n)h¯L(τ)︸︷︷︸
IIIa
]θ + (1− ψ)H(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIb
θ

1/θ
when θ 6= 0, and:
y⋆ =
(
1
2 + n
)
f(τ)1/(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
(αK
R⋆
)α/(1−α) [
(1 + n)h¯λ⋆1
]ψ
H(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIb
1−ψ
when θ = 0, where I, II and III represents the three eﬀects associated with
tighter environmental tax.
Eﬀect I is the conventional crowding-out eﬀect of private capital by the
environmental tax. It comes from the fact that the ﬁnancing public abate-
ment activities requires capital input. Eﬀect II is the health-saving effect.
From Proposition 1, we identify a positive (negative) eﬀect of environmental
taxation on per capita output when young and old labor tend to be sub-
stitutes (complements). Eﬀect III is the health-labor effect. In our simple
case with exogenous retirement and investment in health decisions, it encom-
passes (IIIa) the young labor participation effect (Corollary 1) and (IIIb),
the standard productivity increase due to the positive eﬀect of the environ-
mental tax on health. The young labor participation effect indicates a new
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positive (negative) eﬀect of output per capita when young and old labor tend
to be substitutes (complements). By contrast, the standard productivity in-
crease due to reduced morbidity always has a positive eﬀect on output per
capita in the steady state.
The table below provides a qualitative summary of the eﬀects of environ-
mental taxation on steady state output per capita.
Table 1: Eﬀects on output per capita and substitutability of young and old
labor
θ > 0 θ < 0 θ = 0
I (crowding-out eﬀect) – – –
II (health-saving eﬀect) – + 0
IIIa (young labor participation eﬀect) – + 0
IIIb (productivity eﬀect) + + +
Therefore, consistently with the literature, we retrieve the negative crowd-
ing out eﬀect and the positive productivity eﬀect of environmental taxation.
However, we show that when the evolution of health over the life-cycle is
taken into consideration, reduced morbidity can trigger two additional ef-
fects, the health saving eﬀect and the young labor supply eﬀect. Those two
eﬀects reinforce (weaken) the positive impact of reduced morbidity on output
per capita when young and old labor are complements (substitutes).
3.2 Endogenous retirement, exogenous health expendi-
tures
We reintroduce retirement in the model, setting γ > 0. The retirement deci-
sion is endogenous, and therefore λ⋆2 is given by equation (25).
Using (22), the interest rate at the steady-state is deﬁned by:[
H(τ)Λ2(R
⋆)
(1 + n)Λ1(R⋆, m¯)
]θ
= D(R⋆) (28)
Proposition 2. In the presence of endogenous retirement, Proposition 1
still holds:
R⋆ = R˜(τ) R˜′(τ) R 0 for θ R 0.
h⋆2 = H(τ) H˜
′(τ) > 0 ∀θ ≤ 1.
Proof. See Appendix A
Furthermore,
Corollary 2. In the presence of endogenous retirement,
(i) λ⋆1 = L˜1(τ) with L˜
′
1(τ) S 0 for θ R 0;
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(ii) λ⋆2 = L˜2 (τ) with L˜
′
2(τ) T 0 for θ T 0.
Proof. From (24) and (25) using Proposition 2.
When θ > 0, the tax on pollution limits the decrease in wages over the
life cycle. The relatively higher wage in the ﬁrst period of life increases labor
supply (similarly to Corollary 1). The relatively low wage in the second
period encourages work over retirement. This new general equilibrium eﬀect
is called the health-retirement effect. When θ = 0, the pollution tax has
no eﬀect on the wage proﬁle. Therefore, it has no eﬀect on the retirement
choice either. When θ < 0, the tax on pollution makes the wage proﬁle
ﬂatter. It discourages work in the ﬁrst period of life and discourages work
over retirement in the second period of life.
The inﬂuence of the environmental tax on per capita output can be sum-
marized by:
y⋆ =
(
1
2 + n
)
f(τ)1/(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
(
αK
R˜(τ)
)α/(1−α)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II

ψ[(1 + n)h¯ L˜1(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIa
]θ + (1− ψ)[H(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIb
L˜2(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIc
]θ

1/θ
when θ 6= 0, and:
y⋆ =
(
1
2 + n
)
f(τ)1/(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
(αK
R⋆
)α/(1−α) [
(1 + n)h¯λ⋆1
]ψ
[λ⋆2H(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIb
]1−ψ
when θ = 0.
The table below provides a qualitative summary of the eﬀects of environ-
mental taxation on steady state output per capita.
Table 2: Eﬀects on output per capita and substitutability of young and old
labor
θ > 0 θ < 0 θ = 0
I (crowding-out eﬀect) – – –
II (health-saving eﬀect) – + 0
IIIa (young labor participation eﬀect) – + 0
IIIb (productivity eﬀect) + + +
IIIc (retirement eﬀect) + – 0
Compared to the previous case, in the presence of endogenous retirement
(with a PAYG system), environmental taxation impacts per capita output
growth through an additional channel, the health retirement eﬀect, which
is included in the health labor eﬀect. The health retirement eﬀect further
reinforces (weakens) the positive impact of reduced morbidity on the growth
of output per capita when young and old labor are complements (substitutes).
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3.3 Endogenous retirement, endogenous health-care in-
vestment
We consider the case when both the retirement decision and the decision to
invest in health are endogenous. Thus, m⋆ is endogenous and in equilibrium,
it satisﬁes:
1− 1 + β
1 + β + ϕ+ ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆

 β(1− φ) [1−m⋆]H ′(m⋆)
φϕ
=
H(m⋆) +
[
1− δ(σ−1g(τ))
]
h¯ (29)
Therefore equation (29) gives m⋆ such that
m⋆ = Ω(R⋆, τ) (30)
with ∂Ω(R⋆, τ)/∂R⋆ > 0 and ∂Ω(R⋆, τ)/∂τ < 0.
In the previous scenarios, we assumed an exogenous investment in health.
Thus the tightening of the environmental tax would always lead to an im-
provement of the health proﬁle. When the investment in health is endoge-
nous, it interfers with the eﬀect of the pollution tax on the health proﬁle.
Indeed, if investment in health is reduced when the pollution tax increases,
this potentially can cancel out or reverse the positive eﬀect of the environ-
mental tax on the health proﬁle.
Equation (22) and previous results enable us to obtain the expression of
the steady-state interest rate:{
Λ2(R
⋆)
[
H(Ω(R⋆; τ)) + [1− δ(σ−1g(τ))] h¯
]
(1 + n)Λ1(R⋆,Ω(R⋆; τ))
}θ
= D(R⋆) (31)
Proposition 3. When the retirement decision and the decision to invest
in health are endogenous, Proposition 1 still holds:
R⋆ = ˜˜R(τ) ˜˜R′(τ) R 0 for θ R 0
under the necessary condition (when θ < 0)
ǫΩ(·)τ
[
ǫ
Λ1(·)
Ω(·) − ǫ
h⋆
2
Ω(·)
]
< ǫδ(·)τ ǫ
h⋆
2
δ(·) where ǫ
i
j ≡
∂i/∂j
i/j
. (C1)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Condition (C”1) means that, Ceteris paribus, the contribution of τ on R⋆
throug investment in health m⋆ (captured by the LHS in equation C”1) is
lower than the contribution of τ on R⋆ through health depreciation (captured
by the RHS in equation C”1). In the following, we will consider that condition
(C”1) is veriﬁed.
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Corollary 3.
(i) m⋆ =M(τ) with M′(τ) < 0, ∀θ ≤ 1;
(ii) λ⋆1 =
˜˜L1(τ) with
˜˜L′1(τ) > 0 for θ ≤ 0;
(iii) λ⋆2 =
˜˜L2 (τ) with
˜˜L′2(τ) T 0 for θ T 0
(iv) h⋆2 =
˜˜H(τ) with ˜˜H′(τ) > 0, ∀θ ≤ 1;
Proof. See Appendix C.
In the presence of endogenous retirement and endogenous investment in
health, we retrieve the health retirement (iv) and the productivity eﬀects
(ii). However, endogenous investment in health has two new consequences.
First, environmental taxation impacts per capita output growth through in-
vestment in health(i). Investment in health decreases (respectively increases)
the level of physical capital in the steady-state when young and old labor are
non-unitary substitutes (respectively complements). Second, the young la-
bor eﬀect (iii) is modiﬁed. Contrary to previous cases, the environmental
tax always results in an increase in young labor whether young and old la-
bor are substitutes or complements. Channels (ii) to (iv) increase per capita
aggregate eﬀective labor l⋆.
y⋆ =
(
1
2 + n
)
f(τ)1/(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
(
αK
˜˜R(τ)
)α/(1−α)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
ψ[(1 + n)h¯ ˜˜L1(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIa
]θ + (1− ψ)[ ˜˜H(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIb
˜˜L2(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIc
]θ
1/θ
when θ 6= 0, and:
y⋆ =
(
1
2 + n
)
f(τ)1/(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
(αK
R⋆
)α/(1−α) (1 + n)h¯ ˜˜L1(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIa
ψ [λ⋆2 ˜˜H(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIIb
]1−ψ
when θ = 0.
The table below provides a qualitative summary of the eﬀects of environ-
mental taxation on steady state output per capita.
Table 3: Eﬀects on output per capita and substitutability of young and old
labor
θ > 0 θ < 0 θ = 0
I (crowding-out eﬀect) – – –
II (health-saving eﬀect) – + 0
IIIa (young labor participation eﬀect) ? + +
IIIb (productivity eﬀect) + + +
IIIc (retirement eﬀect) + – 0
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4 Discussion
In the previous section, we showed that the environmental tax inﬂuences
both the interest rate and labor decisions by the young and the old when the
evolution of health over the life-cycle is taken into account and young and
old workers are not unitary substitutes. By contrast with previous contribu-
tions, we showed that eﬀect of the environmental tax on health has general
equilibrium implications that can modify the inﬂuence of the environmen-
tal tax. The purpose of this discussion is twofold. First, we compare the
case when the evolution of health over life-cycle is not taken into account
or investment in health is exogenous with the cases covered in the previous
section. Second, we provide numerical examples to assess the overall impact
of the environmental tax and the role of the new general equilibrium eﬀects.
4.1 Flat health profile
We modify our model to replicate the case when the evolution of health over
the life-cycle is ignored. We consider that health-status is the same for young
and old individuals, that is h2 = h1 = h
⋆ and therefore ∆⋆h = 1. Because
the evolution of the health status is given by equation (3), we obtain the
endogenous expression of the health status in the steady-state:
h⋆ =
H(m⋆)
δ(P ⋆)
(32)
Therefore, equation (22) deﬁning the steady-state interest rate becomes:
[
λ⋆2
(1 + n)λ⋆1
]θ
= D(R⋆) ≡
ψ αL
αK
[
βR⋆ − αK
αL
(1 + β)
]
(1− ψ)
(
(1 + n) + αK
αL
(1 + β)
) > 0 (33)
λ1 and λ2 are always deﬁned respectively by (24) and (25).
Proposition 4. When the evolution of health over the life-cycle is ignored,
(i) if investment in health is exogenous, the steady-state interest rate R⋆
is independent from the environmental tax τ ;
(ii) if investment in health is endogenous:
R⋆ = R̂(τ) with R̂′(τ) S 0 for θ R 0
under the necessary condition (when θ > 0)
ǫΩ(·)τ
[
ǫ
H′(·)
Ω(·) − ǫ
h⋆
Ω(·)
]
< ǫδ(·)τ ǫ
h⋆
δ(·) where ǫ
i
j ≡
∂i/∂j
i/j
. (C’1)
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Proof. (i) Straightforward from equations (33), (24) and (25). (ii) See Ap-
pendix D.
Proposition 4 (i) means that when the evolution of health over the life-
cycle is ignored and investment in health is exogenous, the steady-state in-
terest rate and the labor supply by the young and the old are not aﬀected by
the environmental tax. Therefore the new general equilibrium eﬀects appear
only when investment in health is endogenous. However, if the evolution of
health over the life-cycle is ignored but investment in health is endogenous,
the health saving eﬀect is reversed (Proposition 4 (ii)).
Corollary 4.
If investment in health is endogenous:
(i) m⋆ = M̂(τ) with M̂′(τ) < 0, ∀θ ≤ 1;
(ii) λ⋆1 = L̂1(τ) with L̂
′
1(τ) > 0 for θ ≤ 0;
(iii) λ⋆2 = L̂2 (τ) with L̂
′
2(τ) S 0 for θ T 0
(iv) h⋆ = Ĥ(τ) with Ĥ′(τ) > 0, ∀θ ≤ 1;
If investments in health is exogenous:
(i’) m⋆ = m¯ ;
(ii’) λ⋆1 is independent from τ ;
(iii’) λ⋆2 is independent from τ ;
(iv’) h⋆ = Ĥ (τ) with Ĥ
′
(τ) > 0, ∀θ ≤ 1;
Proof. For (i)-(iv) See Appendix E. (i’) is straightforward. (ii’), (iii’) and
(iv’) come respectively from (24), (25) and (32).
4.2 PAYG system
In our previous study of the steady-state equilibrium, we abstracted from the
PAYG system for convenience. In the current section, we investigate how the
retirement system and the level of the retirement tax tw potentially modify
previous results.
When social security system is taken into account, the equilibrium equa-
tion (22) becomes:
[
λ⋆2
(1 + n)λ⋆1
∆⋆h
]θ
= D˘(R⋆) ≡
ψ αL
αK
[
β(1− τw)R⋆ − αK
αL
(1 + β)− (1 + n)τw
]
(1− ψ)
(
(1 + n) + αK
αL
(1 + β)
) > 0
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(34)
with D˘′(R⋆) > 0. Then:
λ⋆1 = Λ˘1(R
⋆,m⋆) ≡
(1− τw)(1 + β)(1−m⋆)
(1− τw)(1 + β + ϕ) + ϕ(1 + n)
[(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D˘(R⋆) + τw
]
/R⋆
(35)
with ∂Λ˘1(·)/∂R
⋆ < 0 (under the realistic assumption αL ≥ αK)
11 and
∂Λ˘1(·)/∂m
⋆ < 0, and:
λ⋆2 = Λ˘2(R
⋆) ≡
(1 + β)φ
(φ+ γ)(1 + β)− γ + γβ
(
ψ
1−ψ
) [
τw + 1−τ
w
1+n
R⋆
]
/D˘(R⋆)
(36)
with ∂Λ˘2(·)/∂R
⋆ > 0 because
[
τw +
1− τw
1 + n
R⋆
]
/D˘(R⋆) is decreasing in R⋆.
Then, equation (29) becomes:1− 1 + β
1 + β + ϕ+ ϕ(1 + n)
[(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D˘(R⋆) + τw
]
/R⋆
 β(1− φ) [1−m⋆]H ′(m⋆)
φϕ
=
H(m⋆) +
[
1− δ(σ−1g(τ))
]
h¯ (37)
which deﬁnes the investment in health m⋆ as:
m⋆ = Ω˘(R⋆, τ) (38)
with ∂Ω˘(R⋆, τ)/∂R⋆ > 0 and ∂Ω˘(R⋆, τ)/∂τ < 0.
The expression of the steady-state interest rate is given by the following
modiﬁed equation (31):Λ˘2(R
⋆)
[
H(Ω˘(R⋆; τ)) + [1− δ(σ−1g(τ))] h¯
]
(1 + n)Λ˘1(R⋆, Ω˘(R⋆; τ))

θ
= D˘(R⋆) (39)
As a consequence:
Proposition 5. When the retirement decision and the decision to invest
in health are endogenous and there is a Pay-as-you-go system, Proposition 1
still holds:
R⋆ = R˘(τ) R˘′(τ) R 0 for θ R 0
under the necessary condition (when θ < 0):
ǫΩ˘(·)τ
[
ǫ
Λ˘1(·)
Ω˘(·)
− ǫ
h⋆
2
Ω˘(·)
]
< ǫδ(·)τ ǫ
h⋆
2
δ(·) where ǫ
i
j ≡
∂i/∂j
i/j
. (C”1)
11Under this assumption
[(
1− ψ
ψ
)
D˘(R⋆) + τw
]
/R⋆ is an increasing function of R⋆.
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3. See Appendix B.
Thus, the introduction of a PAYG system does not modify qualitatively
the overall impact of the environmental tax on the steady-state interest rate.
Nevertheless, it does not mean that the quantitative impact could not be siz-
able. Because analytical demonstrations are cumbersome, we use numerical
examples in the following section to investigate the quantitative impact of
the environmental tax on the per capita steady-state output with diﬀerent
level for the social security tax.
4.3 Numerical examples
We simulate the model with endogenous retirement and endogenous health
expenditure. We want to stress upon the fact that the objective of this sec-
tion is simply to get a sense of the magnitude and direction of the cumulated
new general equilibrium eﬀects on output and welfare. The numerical sim-
ulations are to be taken with caution considering the following facts. The
model is very stylized, which is necessary to derive theoretical results but it
is limited in its ability to reproduce all the characteristics of the US economy.
The value of a number of parameters of the model is uncertain. Therefore,
we consider that a reasonable strategy is to adjust the parameter values to
reproduce some of the most salient features of the US economy. We present
the parameters chosen in Tables 4, 5 and 6.
The social security tax is 12.4% in the US. The population growth rate
is set at 1% (annually), which is close to the US growth rate of 0.9% in
2012. The rate of time preference β and the consumption weight φ are in
line with the range of values considered by French (2005). The parameters
of the production function are standard as in (reference). The value of θ
reﬂects that young and old labor are imperfect complementary factors of
production as in Hebbink (1993) (more references needed). Since the value
of θ is uncertain and inﬂuences the theoretical results, we provide numerical
results for a wide range of values of θ (Table 9). The preference parameters
are adjusted such that total leisure time is about two thirds of individual time
(Prescott, 2004), and that the time spent on investment in health represents
less than 10% of individual time. We obtain a time spent on investment
in health equal to 9.4% of total time which is within the range of 10% of
.....(reference) and 3.9 to 7.1% of time in lost leisure solely due to bad health
(French, 2005). Welfare is simply measured by utility and we chose the value
of B to obtain a positive welfare in the steady state. Our parameters enable
us to obtain a capital output ratio close to 3, in line with the US economy.
There is great uncertainty regarding the values of the parameters of the
investment in health and pollution functions . For the numerical simulations,
the investment in health function is deﬁned as H (m) = ηmǫ. We also deﬁne
g(τ) = τ−1, and we impose d0 = d1 = 0 in δ (P ) (see equation 4), which
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results in the following pollution function: δ (P ⋆) = ξ (στ)−ς . The chosen
values of the parameters are presented in Table 4. Those values are diﬀerent
from Pautrel (2012), who assumed a linear function for investment in health
with η = 0.8 (and implicitly ǫ = 1), and a non-linear pollution function,
which parameters are equivalent to setting ξ = 0.6, σ = 0.3, and ς = 1. The
study by Skinner (2001) indicates that 20% of medical expenditure provide no
beneﬁt to health, which justiﬁes the choice of η. Besides, the literature does
not provide insights regarding the choice of the parameters of the pollution
function. The best we can do is therefore to provide a sensitivity analysis of
our numerical results to calibration of the investment in health and pollution
functions (Table 13). The health proﬁle depends on the investment in health
and the pollution functions. Overall, with our benchmark calibration, we
obtain a health proﬁle that decreases over the life-cycle (See Table 7).
There is a wide range of estimates regarding the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution between young and old labor. In our simulations, we ﬁnd
that the wage of old workers is 1.4 times the wage of young workers and
hours worked decrease by 4.6% between the two periods of life. As discussed
by French (2005), this combination of a large variations in wages and small
variations in hours worked is consistent with a small intertemporal elasticity
of substitution as is standard in models without uncertainty.
Table 4: Preferences and health
ϕ φ β γ h1 η ǫ
3.5 0.6 0.987 1.5 0.2 0.7 0.5
Table 5: Production and labor substitutability
αK αL B θ ψ
0.3 0.6 200 -0.5 0.6
Table 6: Government, population growth, and pollution
τ τw n ξ σ ς
2% 12.4% 1% 0.87 0.6 0.1
In the tables below, the values corresponding to the benchmark economy
appear in bold.
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Table 7: The economy and the environmental tax
τ
2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
∆h 0.720 0.761 0.785 0.802 0.814
k∗/y∗ 2.916 2.883 2.866 2.855 2.847
Leisure 0.672 0.677 0.680 0.682 0.684
R⋆ 2.631 2.606 2.593 2.584 2.577
λ⋆1 0.234 0.236 0.238 0.239 0.240
λ⋆2 0.216 0.214 0.214 0.213 0.213
m∗ 0.094 0.0857 0.081 0.078 0.076
s∗/y∗ 0.135 0.137 0.139 0.139 0.140
y∗ 59.295 54.706 52.111 50.312 48.943
W ∗ 1.679 1.627 1.592 1.566 1.545
In Table 7, we indicate the steady state values for various levels of the
environmental tax. Our numerical result indicates that a higher environ-
mental decreases output per capita and welfare. Indeed, within our choice of
parameters, the negative eﬀects of environmental taxation dominate the pos-
itive eﬀects. The crowding out eﬀect captured by the decline in k∗/y∗ and
the retirement eﬀect captured by the decrease in λ⋆2 both decrease output
per capita. Those eﬀects dominate the health saving eﬀect captured by the
increase in s∗, the young labor participation eﬀect captured by the increase
in λ⋆1, and the productivity eﬀect captured by the larger ∆h, which have
a positive eﬀect on output per capita. Despite the increase in leisure and
the improvement in the health proﬁle, welfare decreases because the health
saving eﬀect results in lower consumption.
Table 8: Double environmental tax and the health proﬁle
Health proﬁle
Life-cycle Flat
m endogenous m exogenous
% change in
∆h 5.72 0 0
k∗/y∗ -0.94 -4.22 -6.70
Leisure 0.74 0.68 0
R⋆ -0.94 -0.11 0
λ⋆1 1.16 0.56 0
λ⋆2 -0.54 0.07 0
m∗ -8.99 -6.15 0
s∗/y∗ 1.46 -0.22 0
y∗ -7.74 -7.24 -4.52
W ∗ -3.09 -3.18 0
In Table 8, we double the environmental tax from two to four percent
and compare the eﬀect on macroeconomic variables in the benchmark case
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and in the case when the health proﬁle is ﬂat, keeping investment in health
m endogenous (ﬁrst two columns). When the health proﬁle is ﬂat, recall
that the health status improves with the environmental tax over the entire
life-cycle, shifting the health proﬁle. Contrary to the benchmark case, there
is no change in the health proﬁle over the life-cycle. Our numerical simula-
tions indicate that the decrease in output per capita is understated by half a
percentage point if the change in the health proﬁle between the two periods
in life is ignored. Speciﬁcally, ignoring the life-cycle changes in the health
proﬁle leads to largely overstate the crowding-out eﬀect of environmental
taxation. Indeed the decrease in the capital output ratio is overstated by
3.28 percentage points. By contrast with previous analysis, our benchmark
case indicates that the decrease in output per capita is not the result of an
overwhelmingly important crowding-out eﬀect but the cumulated result of
several negative general equilibrium eﬀects related to life-cycle choices. If
the net eﬀect on welfare is very similar in both simulated case, the bench-
mark case indicates that contrary to previous analysis, the decrease in welfare
comes from a larger decrease in second period consumption and ﬁrst period
leisure. The larger decrease in second period consumption is partially oﬀset
by the improvement in the health proﬁle.
In the last column of the table, we present steady state variables when the
health proﬁle is ﬂat and investment in health is exogenous. The health proﬁle
does not change between the two periods in life and individuals cannot adjust
their investment in health as overall productivity increases. Therefore, the
new general equilibrium eﬀects that appeared in the benchmark model dis-
appear. Consistent with the theoretical results, we only retrieve the standard
crowding out and productivity eﬀects. The crowding out eﬀect is overstated
by 4.86 percentage points and the negative eﬀect on output is understated
by 3.22 percentage points compared to the benchmark model. We also ﬁnd
that the negative eﬀect on welfare is understated by 3.09 percentage points
compared to the benchmark case. Indeed, in the last column of the table,
we ﬁnd no eﬀect on welfare as the positive eﬀect of the pollution tax hike on
health is perfectly oﬀset by the decrease in consumption.
Table 9: Double environmental tax and labor substitutability
θ −1 −0.5 −0.1 0.1 0.5 1
% change in:
∆h 5.66 5.72 5.78 5.82 5.95 6.49
R⋆ -1.86 -0.94 -0.19 0.19 0.95 2.45
λ⋆1 1.32 1.16 0.98 0.86 0.57 -0.67
λ⋆2 -0.78 -0.54 -0.15 0.19 1.73 47.06
m∗ -8.98 -8.99 -9.00 -9.04 -8.97 -8.93
y∗ -7.17 -7.74 -8.24 -8.51 -9.15 -10.45
W ∗ -2.66 -3.09 -3.38 -3.51 -3.71 -4.02
In Table 9, we show that when the environmental tax is doubled from
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two to four percent, our numerical results change depending on the value
assigned to the degree of substitutability θ between young and old labor.
Consistent with our theoretical section, the numerical results indicate that
whether the new general equilibrium eﬀects are positive or negative depends
on the degree of substitutability between young and old labor. As shown
in the table, this signiﬁcantly aﬀects the analysis regarding the economic
eﬀects of the environmental tax. If young and old labor are supposed to
be perfect substitutes (θ = 1) like in past contributions, it appears that the
negative eﬀect of environmental taxation on output per capita and welfare are
repectivly overstated by 2.71 percentage points and 0.93 percentage points,
compared to our benchmark case. Indeed, when young and old labor are
perfect substitutes, an increase in the environmental tax leads to a large
reallocation of labor supply toward the second stage of life as individuals are
relatively healthier. On the contrary, when young and old labor are imperfect
complements (θ = −0.5), the reallocation of labor supply is toward the ﬁrst
stage of life and much smaller. Thus, when young and old labor are assumed
to be perfect substitutes, the distortive eﬀect of environmental taxation are
overstated and reversed over the life-cycle compared to our benchmark case.
Table 10: Double environmental tax and population growth
n −1% 0 1% 2% 3%
% change in:
∆h 5.82 5.78 5.72 5.68 5.64
R⋆ -0.77 -0.85 -0.94 -1.04 -1.15
λ⋆1 1.10 1.13 1.16 1.17 1.17
λ⋆2 -0.72 -0.63 -0.54 -0.46 -0.39
m∗ -9.19 -9.02 -8.99 -8.90 -8.81
y∗ -7.97 -7.86 -7.74 -7.61 -7.48
W ∗ -3.00 -3.04 -3.09 -3.17 -3.28
In Table 10, we simulate the eﬀect of a doubling of the environmental tax
from two to four percent for diﬀerent growth rates n of the population. The
long term eﬀects of environmental taxation exhibit small variations within a
wide range of parameters for population growth.
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Table 11: Double environmental tax and retirement
λ2 endogenous λ2 exogenous
γ = 0 γ = 1.5 γ = 3
% change in:
∆h 5.79 5.72 5.71 5.79
R⋆ -0.70 -0.94 -1.06 -0.70
λ⋆1 1.18 1.16 1.15 1.18
λ⋆2 0 -0.54 -0.52 _
m∗ -9.10 -8.99 -8.95 -9.12
y∗ -8.27 -7.74 -7.47 -8.27
W ∗ -2.14 -3.09 -3.90 -2.14
In Tables 11, we simulate the doubling of the environmental tax from two
to four percent for diﬀerent degrees of preference for retirement λ2. We also
simulate the case with exogenous retirement. Our numerical result indicates
that ignoring retirement choices results in overstating the negative eﬀect of
environmental taxation on output per capita by 0.53 percentage points, and
understating the negative eﬀect of environmental taxation on welfare by 0.95
percentage points. As the environmental tax improves the health proﬁle,
it results in postponing retirement, which is beneﬁcial to output and has a
negative eﬀect on welfare.
Table 12: Double environmental tax and Social Security tax
τw 0% 10% 12.4% 15%
% change in:
∆h 5.73 5.73 5.72 5.72
R⋆ -1.02 -0.95 -0.94 -0.93
λ⋆1 1.22 1.19 1.16 1.16
λ⋆2 0.48 0.5 -0.54 -0.54
m∗ -9.04 -9.03 -8.99 -8.97
y∗ -7.66 -7.73 -7.74 -7.75
W ∗ -2.85 -3.03 -3.09 -3.17
In Table 12, we simulate the doubling of the environmental tax for diﬀer-
ent values of the social security tax. In the absence of a social security tax,
the retirement system is not a PAYG but a funded system, which workers
save for their own retirement. Our numerical results indicate that the elimi-
nation of the PAYG would only moderately decrease the negative impact of
environmental taxation on output and welfare respectively by 0.08 and 0.24
percentage points.
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Table 13: Double environmental tax, health and pollution functions
Benchmark H(m) δ (P )
ǫ = 0.7 η = 0.8 ς = 0.2 ξ = 1
% change in:
∆h 5.72 4.96 4.74 16.38 6.31
k∗/y∗ -0.94 -1.65 -0.96 -6.06 -1.54
Leisure 0.74 1.62 0.71 5.03 1.22
R⋆ -0.94 -0.69 -0.80 -2.80 -1.09
λ⋆1 1.16 1.82 0.97 5.77 1.54
λ⋆2 -0.54 -0.35 -0.50 -1.37 -0.60
m∗ -8.99 -10.02 -8.64 -29.02 -11.18
s∗/y∗ 1.46 1.40 1.59 5.41 2.16
y∗ -7.74 -7.72 -8.98 1.26 -7.57
W ∗ -3.09 -3.32 -3.60 20.10 -2.21
In Table 13, we change the parameters of the health investment and the
pollution functions to examine the sensitivity of our results.
We set the value of ǫ to 0.7 to accentuate the non-linearity of the health
investment function, which slightly reinforces the eﬀect of environmental pol-
icy on output and welfare. By extension, ignoring the non-linearity of the
health investment function would lead to understate the eﬀect of environ-
mental taxation. We also increase the eﬀect of health expenditure on health
by setting η = 0.8. This has a more signiﬁcant eﬀect on our results. As
expected, the more health responds to investment in health, the larger the
negative eﬀect of environmental taxation on output and welfare.
We set the value of ς to 0.2 to accentuate the non-linearity of the pollu-
tion function. The numerical results are very sensitive to the value of this
parameter. When the value of ς increases, the productivity eﬀect dominates
the other eﬀects and the impact of the tax hike on output per capita is posi-
tive. Leisure and consumption increase (due to a large health saving eﬀect),
resulting in a large welfare gain. We also increase the eﬀect of the tax on
pollution by increasing the value of ξ to 1. The results are moderately sen-
sitive to this parameter. The more pollution responds to the tax, the larger
the productivity eﬀect and the smaller the negative eﬀect of the tax hike on
output per capita and welfare.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the economic eﬀect of environmental taxation when
pollution impacts morbidity. In contrast with the existing literature, we pro-
pose a model that takes into consideration the interaction between pollution
and health over the life-cycle and its consequences on individual optimal
choices. We show that when the interaction between pollution and health
over the life-cycle is captured, the eﬀect of environmental taxation on health
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are not limited to the traditional negative crowding-out eﬀect and positive
productivity eﬀect. We identify several new general equilibrium eﬀects which
inﬂuence output per capita and are channeled through saving, labor supply
by young and old workers, and investment in health. We show that if the life-
cycle characteristic of the health proﬁle is ignored or investment in health
is considered exogenous, the new general equilibrium eﬀects either do not
appear or are modiﬁed. Numerical examples indicate that those simpler
frameworks tend to understate the negative eﬀect of environmental taxation
on output per capita and welfare. We also show that the direction of re-
sponses of the labor supply and investment in health depends on the degree
of complementarity or substituability between young and old labor. Numer-
ical examples indicate that frameworks assuming that young and old labor
are perfect substitutes tend to overstate the negative eﬀects of environmental
taxation on output per capita and welfare.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
When θ < 0, the LHS of equation (28) is decreasing in τ and in R⋆ because
λ⋆2 = Λ2(R
⋆) is an increasing function of R⋆. Because D(R⋆) is increasing in
τ , (26) deﬁnes a unique positive R⋆ = R˜(τ) with R˜′(τ) < 0. When θ = 0, the
left-hand side of (28) is independent from τ and R⋆. Therefore (28) deﬁnes a
unique positive R⋆ independent from τ . When θ ∈]0, 1], (26) can be written
as (using the expressions of Λ1(R
⋆, m¯) and Λ2(R
⋆)):
H(τ)
(1 + n)
=
(1− m¯)D(R⋆)1/θ−1R⋆
φ
×
[φ(1 + β) + βγ]D(R⋆)/R⋆ +
(
ψ
1−ψ
) (
γβ
1+n
)
(1 + β + ϕ) + ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆
(A.1)
The second term in the RHS of this equation is increasing in D(R⋆)/R⋆: its
derivative with respect to D(R⋆)/R⋆ is equal to:
(1 + β)φψ2
[(1 + n)(1− ψ)D(R⋆)/R⋆ + ψ]2
> 0
Because D(R⋆)/R⋆ is increasing in R⋆, therefore the RHS of the equation is
increasing in R⋆ while the LHS is increasing in τ . Therefore (28) deﬁnes a
unique positive R⋆ = R˜(τ) with R˜′(τ) > 0.
B Proof of Proposition 3
When θ = 0, Lemma 1 applies. When θ < 0, equation (31) may be written
as:
D(R⋆)1/θ
Λ2(R⋆)
(1+n)Λ1(R
⋆,Ω(R⋆; τ))−H(Ω(R⋆; τ))−
[
1− δ(σ−1g(τ))
]
h¯ = 0
(B.1)
where the LHS is decreasing in R⋆. Therefore, under the condition that
lim
R⋆→1
LHS > 0 > lim
R⋆→+∞
LHS, there exists a unique steady-state interest rate
R⋆. The inﬂuence of τ on the LHS is given by the sign of the derivative of the
LHS with respect to τ : τ−1{ǫΩ(·)τ︸︷︷︸
−
[ǫ
Λ1(·)
Ω(·)︸︷︷︸
−
− ǫ
h⋆
2
Ω(·)︸︷︷︸
+
]− ǫδ(·)τ︸︷︷︸
−
ǫ
h⋆
2
δ(·)︸︷︷︸
−
} where ǫij ≡
∂i/∂j
i/j
.
When this expression is negative (resp. positive), from the theorem of the
implicit function, R⋆ is a decreasing (resp. increasing) function of τ .
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When θ ∈]0, 1], equation (31) may be written as (using (29)):
H ′ (Ω(R⋆; τ))
(1 + n)
=
D(R⋆)1/θ−1R⋆
β(1− φ)
×
[φ(1 + β) + βγ]D(R⋆)/R⋆ +
(
ψ
1−ψ
) (
γβ
1+n
)
1 + (1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆
(B.2)
The second term in the RHS of this equation is increasing in D(R⋆)/R⋆: its
derivative with respect to D(R⋆)/R⋆ is equal to:
(1 + β) [φ+ β(γ + φ) + φϕ]ψ2
[(1 + n)ϕ(1− ψ)D(R⋆)/R⋆ + (1 + β + ϕ)ψ]2
> 0
Because D(R⋆)/R⋆ is increasing in R⋆, therefore the RHS of the equation is
increasing in R⋆ while the LHS is increasing in τ . Therefore (28) deﬁnes a
unique positive R⋆ = R(τ) with R′(τ) > 0.
C Proof of Corollary 3
For (i) when θ ≤ 0, it is straightforward from equation (29). When θ > 0,
from equation (B.2), H ′(m⋆) is equal to an expression increasing in R⋆. Be-
cause H ′(m⋆) is decreasing in m⋆, it means that m⋆ is equal to an expression
decreasing in R⋆. From Proposition 3, m⋆ is therefore decreasing in τ .
For (ii), it is straightforward that λ⋆1 is increasing in τ when θ < 0, from
equations (24), (30) and Proposition 3. When θ = 0, Lemma 1 applies,
therefore from equations (24) and (30) λ⋆1 is increasing in τ .
equation (29) enables us to write:
λ⋆1 = [1−m
⋆]− φϕ
H(m⋆) + [1− δ(σ−1g(τ))] h¯
β(1− φ)H ′(m⋆)
(C.1)
For (iii) see Proposition 3 and equation (23).
For (iv), the RHS of equation (29) is h⋆2. When θ ≥ 0, from Proposition
3, Corollary 3(i) and the fact that D(R⋆)/R⋆ is increasing in R⋆, the RHS
is increasing in τ , therefore h⋆2 is increasing in τ when θ ≥ 0. When θ < 0,
from equation (31), Proposition (3) and Corollary 3(ii), h⋆2 is increasing in τ .
D Proof of Proposition 4(ii)
When m⋆ is endogenous, with ∆⋆h = 1 and h¯ is replaced by h
⋆ deﬁned by
(32), we obtain m⋆ as an implicit function of R⋆ and τ :
φϕ
β(1− φ)
H(m⋆)
(1−m⋆)H ′(m⋆)
= δ(σ−1g(τ))
1− (1 + β)
1 + β + ϕ+ ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆

(D.1)
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The LHS is an increasing function of m⋆ and the RHS is decreasing in τ and
increasing in R⋆, therefore this expression deﬁnes:
m⋆ = Ω˜(R⋆; τ) (D.2)
with ∂Ω˜(R⋆; τ)/∂R⋆ > 0 and ∂Ω˜(R⋆; τ)/∂τ < 0. From (24) and (25):
λ⋆2
λ⋆1
=
φ
[
(1 + β + ϕ) + ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆
]
(1− Ω˜(R⋆; τ))
[
(φ+ γ)(1 + β)− γ +
(
ψ
1−ψ
) (
γβ
1+n
)
R⋆/D(R⋆)
]
that is λ⋆2/λ
⋆
1 is increasing in R
⋆ and decreasing in τ . Using (33), we obtain
the expression of the steady-state interest rate as a function of τ :

 φ1+n
[
(1 + β + ϕ) + ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆
]
(1− Ω˜(R⋆; τ))
[
(φ+ γ)(1 + β)− γ +
(
ψ
1−ψ
) (
γβ
1+n
)
R⋆/D(R⋆)
]


θ
= D(R⋆)
(D.3)
When θ < 0, the LHS is decreasing in R⋆ and increasing in τ while the RHS
is always increasing in R⋆. From the implicit function theorem, we obtain
that R⋆ is increasing in τ . When θ = 0, Lemma 1 applies: R⋆ is independent
from τ .
When θ ∈]0, 1], using equation (24) and (25) to replace respectively λ⋆1
and λ⋆2 in equation (D.1), we obtain:
φβ(1− φ)H ′(Ω˜(R⋆; τ))
H(Ω˜(R⋆; τ))
δ(σ−1g(τ)) =
[(φ+ γ)(1 + β)− γ]D(R⋆)/R⋆ +
(
ψ
1−ψ
) (
γβ
1+n
)
ϕ+ ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆
D(R⋆)
1
θ
−1R⋆ (D.4)
Because the ratio in the RHS of this equation is increasing in D(R⋆)/R⋆,
because D(R⋆)/R⋆ is increasing in R⋆ and 1/θ− 1 > 0, therefore the RHS is
an increasing function of R⋆. From (30) and the deﬁnition of H(·), the LHS
is decreasing in R⋆. Therefore there exists a unique stray-state interest rate
R⋆.
Under the necessary condition that ∂LHS/∂τ < 0, from the theorem of
the implicit function, R⋆ is a decreasing function of τ . This condition can be
written as:
ǫΩ(·)τ
[
ǫ
H′(·)
Ω(·) − ǫ
h⋆
Ω(·)
]
< ǫδ(·)τ ǫ
h⋆
δ(·) where ǫ
i
j ≡
∂i/∂j
i/j
. (C’1)
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E Proof of Corollary 4
For (i) when θ ∈ [0, 1], it is straightforward from equation (D.2) and Propo-
sition 4(ii). When θ < 0, from equation (D.3), we can write that:
m⋆ = 1−
φ
1+n
[
(1 + β + ϕ) + ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆
]
D(R⋆)1/θ
[
(φ+ γ)(1 + β)− γ +
(
ψ
1−ψ
) (
γβ
1+n
)
R⋆/D(R⋆)
]
where the RHS is decreasing in R⋆. From Proposition 4(ii), it means that
m⋆ is decreasing in τ .
For (iv) when θ ∈ [0, 1], equation (D.4) can be written as:
h⋆ =
H(m⋆)
δ(σ−1g(τ))
= φβ(1− φ)H ′(m⋆)×
 [(φ+ γ)(1 + β)− γ]D(R⋆)/R⋆ +
(
ψ
1−ψ
) (
γβ
1+n
)
ϕ+ ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆
D(R⋆)
1
θ
−1R⋆


−1
(E.5)
where the RHS is decreasing in R⋆ from the demonstration of Proposition 4
(see comments below equation D.4) and increasing in τ from Corollary 4(i).
From Proposition 4(ii) R⋆ is decreasing in τ , therefore the RHS is increasing
in τ and h⋆ is increasing in τ .
When θ < 0, equation (D.1) may be written as:
h⋆ =
H(m⋆)
δ(σ−1g(τ))
=
β(1− φ)(1−m⋆)H ′(m⋆)
φϕ

1− (1 + β)
1 + β + ϕ+ ϕ(1 + n)
(
1−ψ
ψ
)
D(R⋆)/R⋆


(E.6)
where the RHS is increasing in R⋆ and increasing in τ from the deﬁnition
of H(·) and Corollary 4(i). From Proposition 4(ii) R⋆ is increasing in τ ,
therefore the RHS is increasing in τ and h⋆ is increasing in τ .
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